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Abstract
Purpose. This study offers a better understanding of supply side of bribery and corruption in an 
international business perspective by conceptualizing it in the narrower concept of MIB, derived 
from the deontological perspective to business ethics. 
Methods. We use a case study methodology of professionals working within Canadian mining 
multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in Africa. We conducted 2 focus groups, 25 in-depth 
interviews, document search and an open-ended questionnaire to 15 professionals. Further, we 
drew on a combination of the classic relationalist sociological framework and its recent revision, 
that we name the relationalism-substantialism framework to analyze the data. 
Findings. The triangulated empirical data show that the reason why MIB in the form of bribery 
supply occurs is not exclusively tied to any given perspective, whether the individual, the 
organization or the wider societal context. Rather, these different layers are tightly intertwined and 
interact with each other for the supply of bribery to occur. 
Originality. Although the three siloed perspectives of MIB have been studied in the literature, they 
have not been addressed in relation to one another, and even less with a relationalism-
substantialism framework Yet, this perspective contributes compellingly to the understanding of 
the supply side in bribery. We propose a net of conceptually-related constructs that intervene in 
the process of bribery supply occurrence, namely relationality influenced by institutional 
dysfunctionality and conflation; and substantiality through agency and culture.
Keywords: Misconduct in business; corruption; international business; substantialism; 
relationalism; multinational companies.
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Article classification: research paper.
1. Introduction
Misconduct in Business (hereafter, MIB) occurs during the exercise of a given profession, is
intentional, usually defined, and regulated by the profession itself, and violating norms and 
expectations of a variety of stakeholders such as other professionals, clients, and the general 
public (Neale, 1996; Muzio et al., 2016; Dixon-Woods et al., 2011). Given the widespread 
occurrence of MIB across industries and nations, MIB has become a significant topic of 
examination (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Muzio et al., 2016; Palmer, 2012; Vaughan, 1999). In 
line with previous calls to study MIB from a corruption perspective (e.g. De Graaf, 2007), this 
study proposes that if we are to understand the broader concept of corruption and its supply side, 
we must consider it in the narrower concept of MIB, derived from the deontological perspective 
to business ethics. We focus on the mining industry in particular.
More specifically, this study posits that MIB is a much under-explored notion to understand 
corruption and the supply side of corruption in international business. Corruption is commonly 
defined as the abuse of entrusted power for private gain (Transparency International, 2018). As 
such, corruption, and more specifically, bribery, is typically viewed and defined from the 
demand side. In contrast, MIB refers more directly to the supply side by illuminating the 
supplying component needed for corruption to occur. This component can be individuals, but in 
case of international business, it refers most commonly to multinational corporations (hereafter, 
MNCs). Corruption is an entry strategy in foreign markets (Rodriguez et al., 2005) but also a 
mean for continued presence (Luo, 2006; Duanmu, 2011). MIB is all the more relevant since 
there are often a great variety of professions working within a given MNC, from engineers to 
lawyers, architects to bankers. Executive boards exemplify this as chief executives are very often 
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members of professional orders (e.g. chartered accountants, managers, engineers, or legal 
executives)1. As such, they are usually in charge of decision-making processes and thus 
negotiations with public officials offshore. This study posist MIB as a key concept to understand 
the supply side of corruption in international business because it challenges the widespread 
assumption in the literature (e.g. Petrou and Thanos, 2014; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008) that 
governements are the instigators of corruption to which MNCs merely respond. While 
acknowledging the impact of political forces, it extends the focus on MNCs as well, by 
emphasizing how professional misconduct contributes to corruption. 
Three siloed perspectives are usually mobilized to explain MIB: a) The functionalist 
perspective (the bad apple hypothesis); b) The conflict perspective (the red barrel hypothesis); 
and c) The ecological perspective (the bad cellar perspective). While each of these perspectives 
offers useful guidance for understanding the different layers of MIB (micro, meso and macro 
levels), they have usually been considered either in isolation of each other or as alternatives of 
each other (Muzio et al., 2016). Therefore, although these levels have been studied in the 
literature, they have not been addressed in relation to one another, and even less to explain 
corruption by MNCs. This paper addresses the following question: How do the functionalist, 
conflict and ecological perspectives play together lead to MIB that contributes to the supply side 
of corruption in international business? 
Drawing on the relationalism-substantialism theoretical framework in sociology (Festinger, 
1954; Bourdieu, 1998; Bajoit, 1992; Mische, 2011; Emirbayer, 1997), we propose a new 
perspective on MIB that aggregates the three, otherwise disparate perspectives, into a coherent 
1 Board of directors of BHP Billiton, number one mining company worldwide: https://www.bhp.com/our-
approach/our-company/leadership-team (accessed 17-05-2018); Executive board of Rio Tinto, number two mining 
company worldwide : http://www.riotinto.com/aboutus/management-board-3502.aspx (accessed 17-05-2018).
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whole. Our research has been conducted in the context of Canadian MNCs mining operations in 
Africa. Using a rich and varied corpus of data sources and data collection methods, we propose a 
theoretical framework bridging different MIB perspectives in order to understand the supply-side 
of corruption in a MNC context. 
2. Literature review
2.1. Justification of the misconduct in business framework for the study of corruption in 
international business
MIB takes professions as the reference point, meaning that behaviour is regulated through a 
set of deontological norms consigned in professional codes and guidelines (Muzio et al., 2016). 
There are three groups of MIB theories, that are essential frameworks for enlightened business 
practices. The first are consequence-based (or teleological) theories, the most prominent of 
which being utilitarianism (Bentham, 1984; Mill, 1979). An action is judged as proper conduct 
based on its outcomes – to advance the greater good of those impacted by the action-, not the 
action itself or the intentions behind the action (Bentham, 1984; Mill, 1979). However, “many 
opinions exist as to what constitutes the nature of the actuel benefits of a particular action” 
(Murphy et al., 2017, p. 31). This is enhanced in an international context where managers are in 
contact with many stakeholders but also various cultural frameworks, social norms and 
principles. A second issue is that, through consequence-based frames, the ends justify otherwise 
unacceptable means (Murphy et al., 2017). Corruption would be acceptable in all cases because 
it reaches desirables ends such as the securing of contracts, the “greasing” of otherwise unending 
administrative procedures and the tipping of bureaucratic arbitrage in favor of the supplying 
company. Third, without consideration for the intrinsic nature of the action, and adherence to 
strict ethical guidelines, in an international context, companies adopt a case-by-case approach 
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which may result in corruption being paid more often than not. For all these reasons, 
consequence-based approaches to ethics are problematic.
The second group of theories is based on virtue. It is a renaissance of the Greek ideal 
suggesting that the purpose in life is seeking to live a virtuous life through a quest for goodness 
and moral character (MacIntyre, 1984; Aristotle, 1962). The focus is not on the consequences of 
the action but on individual character (Aristotle, 1962). In contrast to consequence-based 
theories, virtue-based ethics lead to ethical decision-making for intrinsic rather than extrinsic 
reasons. However, business professors and executives have developed several lists of virtues for 
business (e.g. Murphy, 1999). Disagreement appeared about which characteristics should appear 
on a list of virtues to which organizations should aspire. Furthermore, in an organizational 
context, it is often difficult to agree on what constitutes “the good”, leaving the door open to 
multiple interpretations and overall relativism (Murphy et al., 2017). The issue is even more 
salient in IB where corporations’ values and principles may clash with foreign ones. Third, the 
theory assumes that people and organizations aspire to higher levels of ethics (Aristotle, 1962), 
yet this may not always be the case. For all these reasons, the proponents of the re-introduction 
of virtue ethics themselves, such as MacIntyre (1984), were skeptical about the appropriateness 
of the implementation of virtue ethics in an organizational context. 
A third group of theories denominated duty-based (or deontological) theories offer an 
interesting middle-ground. The MIB framework draws on these theories. These theories (e.g. 
Kant’s categorical imperatives [Kant, 1785/1981], Ross’s seven prima facie duties [1930/2003]) 
shift the analysis to the unit of the action. In sum, actions are judged in isolation of their 
consequences and if they correspond to fundamental human obligations, called duties. An 
important implication is that, managers may thus take decisions that do not produce the best 
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economic consequences, because some actions (e.g. corruption) may violate basic duties such as 
treating everyone fairly (Murphy et al., 2017). Although it may be argued that many different 
deontological theories exist, we resolve this issue in the current study by proposing to focus on 
professional deontological codes as the point of reference for business executives to rely on. 
First, these codes are usually delineated in executives’ home coutry and adhere therefore to 
potentially stricter guidelines with regards to corruption. Second, conflicts between two absolute 
moral duties or more may often emerge within the deontological framework. However, in 
contrast to lists of duties (e.g. Ross, 1930/2003), professional codes are coherent frames so that 
principles and duties, purposefully designed for a given profession, do not conflict with one 
another. Third, professional codes incorporate legal requirements while often embodying higher 
standards than the law (Muzio et al., 2016). The very notion of ethics assumes the bestowing of a 
greater obligation of moral duty upon professionals than merely conforming to the law. In an 
international business context, the deontological framework - and the MIB perspective it entails-, 
would thus be comparatively much more powerful in the controlling of the supply side of 
corruption than the opportunistic perspective of consequence-based theories or the 
unoperationalizable quest for good character of virtue-based theories. Adherence to a stable and 
formal framework of duties and guidelines as delineated in professional codes offers the obvious 
advantage of and integrity of business practices throughout varying legalistic, judicial or cultural 
grounds. 
For all these reasons, this research adopts the deontological perspective. The existence of 
professional codes of conduct logically implies that lack of conformance leads to MIB. For the 
first time, we therefore propose that MIB is a useful framework to advance our understanding of 
corruption in an international business context. The next section discusses in more details the 
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different perspectives existing to explain MIB.
2.1. The functionalist perspective: the “bad apple” hypothesis
The functionalist perspective, considers MIB as rooted in the individual: ‘misconduct results 
from the behaviour of rogue individuals acting against the standards and norms of their 
profession’ (Muzio et al., 2016, p.5-6). Those who misbehave are bad apples (Coleman, 1987; 
Dixon-Woods et al., 2011) and have defective human character and wrong value system 
predisposing them to MIB. The bad apple hypothesis confines the level of analysis to the micro 
level of the individual (De Graaf, 2007), with his or her character, values and/or perceptions as 
the root cause of MIB. 
2.2. The conflict perspective: the “red barrel” hypothesis
According to this view, the unit of analysis is the organization, instead of the individual. This 
perspective explains MIB as a ‘red barrel’ (Dixon-Woods et al., 2011) and posits that the 
responsibility of the individual is lessened and the analysis is restricted to the meso level of the 
organization (De Graaf, 2007; Muzio et al., 2016). Several investigators questioned to what 
extent Albert ‘Jack’ Stanley was exposed to relatively lax accounting and reporting rules within 
KBR. The company had repeatedly failed to implement adequate accounting controls in its 
African subsidiaries. Besides, M. Stanely was not operating alone but in close cooperation with 
his associates and the joint venture partners, whom may all have an influence on his actions 
(Goldberg and Carr, 2013). 
2.3. The ecological perspective: the “bad cellar” hypothesis
The ecological perspective views MIB as a consequence of the influence of higher-order 
factors (Coffee, 2006; De Graaf, 2007). MIB occurs because of various macro-environmental 
forces exerting pressure on both individuals and organizations. The ecological perspective 
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implies a “bad cellar hypothesis” (Muzio et al., 2016). Both individual and organizational 
responsibilities are reduced and MIB occurs because of macro environmental factors affecting 
the individual both directly and indirectly through the organization. The joint venture headed by 
Albert ‘Jack’ Stanley evolved in the context of Nigeria’s political culture that is plagued with 
corruption. In fact, Nigeria is one of the world’s most corrupt countries, ranking 136th on the 
corruption perceptions index (Transparency International, 2016). Socio-cultural and political 
forces, beyond organizational culture and norms, might thus have strongly impacted individual 
behavior to corruption. 
3. Theoretical framework
The prevalent view in the literature, on the deontological approach to ethics, is that of a 
deterministic linear logic pertaining to MIB. The literature consists thus of a typology of 
essentialized factors supposed to lead to MIB (Muzio et al., 2016). However, the three different 
layers of influence tend to interact and exert simultaneous influences. They should thus be 
considered holistically rather than separately. In sum, the bad apple that conflates with an 
essentialist perspective intertwines with the two other perspectives exerting higher-order 
influences emanating from both the organization and society at large.  
To combine these different perspectives together we draw on the relational perspective 
framework (Festinger, 1954 Bourdieu, 1998; Bajoit, 1992; Mische, 2011), which posits 
contextual influences and conflates therefore with the conflict and the ecological perspectives. 
We further mobilize the substantialist perspective (Bottero, 2009; Murphy, 2011), which, in 
contrast to relationalism, posits that intersubjectivity and individual characteristics are core to the 
study of objects and phenomena (i.e., functionalist perspectives). We shall first introduce both 
perspectives and then explain how we reconcile these frameworks into a consistent whole. The 
Page 8 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cpoib
critical perspectives on international business
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
critical perspectives on international business
reconciliation of both frameworks that underlie the three perspectives on MIB, will better 
demonstrate how these three perspectives intermingle and exert simultaneous rather than 
separate influences to explain MIB.
3.1. The relationalistic perspective
The relational perspective framework (Festinger, 1954 Bourdieu, 1998; Bajoit, 1992; Mische, 
2011) views individuals not as self-subsistent or self-acting entities. Rather, it views practices as 
constitutive of individuals (Emirbayer, 1997, p.281). According to Bourdieu: ‘Objects under 
investigation are seen in context, as part of a whole […] Their meaningfulness is determined not 
by the characteristic properties, attributes, or essences of the thing itself, but rather with 
reference to the field of objects, practices, or activities within which they are embedded’ (Mohr, 
2013, p.101-102). As such, relationalism is an anti-essentialism. One of the most prominent 
theorists of relationalism is Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu’s approach (1998) can be recast in a wider 
net of sociological theories known as relational sociology, which emphasize relationalism over 
substantialism to explain and interpret social phenomena (Donati, 2007). To Bourdieu (1998), 
the real is relational. Nothing exists except by the comparative relational comparisons and 
differentiations from other objects in a comprehensive whole (Mohr, 2013, p. 101). This 
relational framework formed the conceptual basis for the theory of social comparison processes, 
that emphasized how social comparison is important in opinion formation (Festinger, 1954). In 
applying the Bourdieusian relational theory to our own study, both MIB and good conduct exist 
in relation to the institutionality of professional codes, rules, norms and laws, against which any 
action can be compared and categorized as good professional conduct or MIB. An increase in 
MIB could occur when relationality is attenuated, that is, when the difference between MIB and 
good professional conduct becomes blurred. 
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3.2. The substantialist perspective
Bourdieu’s relational framework has often been criticized for privileging social relations 
between social positions at the expense of exploring the substance of these positions, which is  
disengagement with the intersubjective (Bottero, 2009; Murphy, 2011). In contrast, the 
substantialist approach ‘privileges things rather than relations and, as such, has a tendency to 
reify the social order, to essentialize social phenomena, and to embody a positivist orientation to 
social research’ (Mohr, 2013, p. 101). According to the substantialist perspective, MIB should 
thus also be understood in the inherent essence, substance or characteristics of the actors 
involved in its potential enactment, which are essentialist considerations. Individual 
intersubjectivity lies at the core of this perspective. The notion of substantiality captures 
intersubjectivity and judgement in lieu of relativisitic comparatism. 
3.3. Beyond the relationalist-substantialist divide
Pure relationality cannot create objects. Relations need substances and substances need 
relations (Murphy, 2011). Furthermore, the relationalistic perspective supposes that, all action is 
always trans-action, so that it has important implications that are transcending the momentary 
intent (Emirbayer, 1997, p.281). In other words, individual agency may affect culture or the 
reverse. Besides, both agency and culture may concur to create a climate of attenuated 
relationality. The combination of attenuated relationality, at the meso and macro levels, and 
negatively-valenced substantialism, at the micro level, creates potential for MIB diffusion. If we 
relate this to the three perspectives on MIB derived from the literature, this means that both the 
conflict and the ecological perspectives, are nourished by the functionalist perspective. The 
mixed relationalism-substantialism framework explains the occurrence of MIB by an attenuation 
of relationality at the meso and macro levels because of an increase or prevalence of negatively-
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valenced substantialism, at the micro level. Conversely, the functionalist perspective is equally 
impacted by higher-order red barrel and bad cellar environments, because in both there is a rise 
or prominence of attenuated relationality. 
4. Field study
4.1. Study f amework
We applied the relationalism-substantialism theoretical framework to the study of MIB, in the 
context of a field study on corruption in the Canadian mining sector in Africa. 
Corruption as MIB. We explore the specific case of Canadian mining companies. These 
companies comprise of diverse professions, engineers, lawyers and business executives, all of 
which are regulated by their respective professions in Canada. MIB in this study corresponds to 
the corruption (i.e. bribery) because: 1) from the perspective of Canadian professional 
associations, such practices are unequivocally considered as highly reprehensible; 2); they occur 
during the exercise of each respective profession; 3) they are intentional; and 4) they violate 
norms and expectations of a variety of stakeholders such as, other professionals, clients, the 
government, and the public.
Study context. Canada is one of the biggest players in African mining, owning half of the 315 
listed non-African mining businesses in Africa, six of the 12 largest companies operating in the 
continent are Canadian, and Canadian companies have invested around $20 billion in African 
mining projects (Campbell 2011). From a relational perspective, Canadian mining organizations 
typically deal with institutions and professional associations, characterized by strong 
relationality, i.e. sharp distinctions between good corporate behaviour and reprehensible 
behaviour. However, despite exemplary conduct at home (Fraser Institute, 2016) Canadian 
mining companies are regularly blamed for misbehaving abroad, especially in Africa 
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(Tscherning, 2017; Stapenhurst et al., 2017). Why the discrepancy? On one hand, the weakness 
of the host countries’ institutions might be in cause (Burgis, 2016). According to a report by 
Ernst & Young (2011) mining is the most heavily regulated industry and avenues for corruption 
are therefore wide; officials who have the power to block, delay or frustrate a project may 
attempt to solicit bribes for the benign exercise of that power (O’Higgins, 2006). Regulation 
increases the demand side’s opportunities to ask for bribes to which the supply side may abide or 
not. While diminishing levers for bribery, lack of regulation may be much worse since 
uncontrolled organizations may over-exploit resources, causing environmental and social harm. 
On the other hand, the Canadian Government is also being blamed for being relatively lax 
(Drohan, 2010), and has consequently developed a tougher corporate social responsibility 
strategy to strengthen Canada’s extractive operations abroad (Global Affairs Canada, 2016). 
Since 2009, Canadian mining companies have been subject to the Corruption of Foreign Public 
Officials Act, which makes it a crime in Canada for bribing officials in other countries. However, 
despite the strengthened meaure and the report indicating that corruption may not be worthwhile 
financially (Fraser Institute, 2016), Canadian companies continue to be embroiled in subversive 
cases overseas (e.g. Burgis, 2016; Kisenga, 2016; Tscherning, 2017). 
We studied the Canadian mining companies in two African countries: Ghana and Burkina 
Faso. Both are similar in terms of perceived corruption: Ghana ranks 56th and Burkina Faso 76th, 
respectively out of 167 countries (Transparency International, 2015). However, it is worth 
mentioning that corruption money, collected by the demand side of bribery, i.e. officials from 
these countries, needs “safe sanctuaries” which are usually institutionalized in the financial 
markets of developed economies, characterized by strong relationality and thus a necessary 
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prevalence of secrecy and offshore jurisdictions (Christensen, 2012). The demand for corruption 
in those countries is also a result of developed countries’ lax regulations of financial markets. 
4.2. Methodological approach
Given the fact that our study of MIB relies on the relational theoretical framework, we adopt 
Liederman’s (2005) procedure of qualitative comparisons of cases on Ghana and Burkina Faso. 
In ‘qualitative comparisons of cases […] the relationship between theory and facts is captured 
largely in narrative form’ (Lieberman, 2005, p. 436). The case study methodology enables in-
depth qualitative look at oversight within a particular socio-political context, by capturing the 
texture and real life experience, while simultaneously relating this experience to theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In addition, the comparative aspect of qualitative comparisons of cases 
enables to compare two different countries with differing levels of MIB proliferation.
4.2.1. Document research
We searched public documents as a prime data resource; we considered international 
organizations (e.g. IMF, World Bank) reports on country corruption, parliamentary inquires and 
debates (in Burkina Faso), and newspapers reports on mining and MIB over the past five years to 
‘make replicable and valid inferences from data in their context’ (Krippendorff, 1980, p. 21). In 
other words, we were able to examine the relationship between content and context, which 
assisted us to triangulate other data collected through interviews and focus groups. 
4.2.2. Focus groups 
Two sets of focus groups were conducted in Ghana. The first was held with the Canadian 
mining company representatives and the Canadian government officials who were recruited by 
the Canadian High Commission. The participants demanded Chatham House Rule, without note-
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taking during the meeting. However, two members of our research team, immediately after the 
meeting, made notes on the contents and dynamics of the discussions. 
The second focus group involved parliamentary staff working on oversight/corruption issues, 
CSO representatives and journalists. The nine participants were recruited with the help of the 
African Centre for Parliamentary Affairs, a non-governmental organization. A research assistant 
made notes on who was speaking and noted non-verbal interactions. The session was audio taped 
and transcribed professionally. We designed and carefully facilitated the focus groups to 
minimize non-response from the participants due to the sensitive nature of the topic. 
Administrative and logistical constraints prevented us from organizing a focus group in Burkina 
Faso.
4.2.3. Key Informant Interviews
We interviewed 25 participants in Ghana and Burkina Faso, comprising approximately equal 
numbers of company representatives, government officials, parliament members, and civil 
society representatives. The interview protocol comprised both open-ended and closed ended 
questions.  Through the interviews, we sought to find out what participants know about 
corruption in the country, what the key informants do when faced with MIB in carrying out their 
work duties (behaviours) and what they think about the mining companies and the role that they 
are currently/potentially playing in curbing corruption (beliefs/attitudes). We designed a 
sequence of loosely structured questions in each of the introduction, main body, cool-off, and 
closure phases of the interview. Each interview took 45-60 minutes. Respondents were 
encouraged to add any additional information they deemed relevant.  
4.2.4. Open-ended Questionnaire Survey
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An open-ended questionnaire was implemented on executives of Canadian mining companies 
operating mainly in Ghana and Burkino Faso. The survey was implemented either in-person or 
electronically, and 15 executives participated the survey. 
During the data collection and analysis phases, we dated all contacts, resulting actions, and 
coding. Coding the open-ended questions involved combining the detailed responses into a small 
number of categories to describe and systematically analyze the data. 
4.5. Trustworthiness and auditability 
We ensured trustworthiness of the findings by securing credibility, transferability, 
dependability and confirmability criteria (Guba and Lincoln, 1982). In line with Onwuegbuzie 
and Leech (2007), triangulation ensured credibility with the use of multiple and different 
methods (i.e. document research, focus groups, interviews, open-ended questionnaire survey), 
investigators (two different investiagtors) and data sources (i.e. journalists, business 
professionals, CSO activists, government represe tatives). Transferability refers to the degree to 
which the results can transfer to other contexts with other respondents (Tobin and Begley, 2004). 
We thus provided thick description regarding the methodology but also the context of the study 
in the above-mentioned sections (Li, 2004). In line with Li (2004), in the next section we also 
explain all the research processes from data collection, analysis of the data to the identification of 
the resulting themes. This may enable other researchers to replicate the study with similar 
conditions in different settings (Anney, 2014). We also performed theoretical / purposive 
sampling since we selected respondents based on the specific purposes associated with 
answering the research questions (Teddlie and Yu, 2007). Dependability refers to the stability of 
findings over time (Bitsch, 2005). To this end, we performed an audit trail, during which we 
accounted for all the research decisions and activities to show how the data were collected and 
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analyzed (Li, 2004). To do so, we kept the following documents for cross-checking: all the raw 
data, the interview and observation summaries and notes, all the documents and records collected 
from the field, the questionnaires and documents including reports (Guba and Lincoln, 1982). 
Confirmability is the degree to which the results of a study could be confirmed or corroborated 
by other studies (Anney, 2014). Past research stated that “audit trail offers visible evidence [from 
the process to the end result of the qualitative inquiry] that the researcher did not simply find 
what he or she set out to find” (Bowen, 2009, p. 307). We thus used the audit trail to ensure 
confirmability. In addition to trustworthiness, the study ensures auditability, that is, the reader 
being able to follow the different staps of the research process (i.e. from research questions to the 
data collection and to the findings). By writing our manuscript in a linear sequence, which 
presents all these sections in order, we ensure auditability. 
4.6. Analytical procedure
In line with the theoretical saturation principle (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), we have stopped 
data collection after we reached the point where the sampling of more data would not lead to 
more information related to our research questions (Seale, 1999). We then conducted a thematic 
analytical procedure of the data obtained from the focus groups, expert interviews and in-depth 
interviews. Open coding developed a succession of concepts which were assigned to short and 
then larger textual passages (Böhm, 2004). Axial coding refined and differentiated the concepts 
further to transform them into categories (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Figure 1 shows graphically 
how the progressive data structure, which highlights the movement from description to 
conceptual ordering to theorizing (Strauss and Corbin, 1998).
--- Insert Figure 1 about here ---
5. Data analysis
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5.1. Relationality
MIB deviates from expected business behaviours, as defined in a set of laws by the 
government and also charters or codes of practice by professional organizations. Codes of 
practice closely tie to government laws, and serve as differientiators between what is acceptable 
and what is not, allowing relational comparisons. Thus, code-trained businesspeople know what 
makes a business conduct acceptable. The supply of a bribes is unequivocally reprehensible in all 
professional codes. The issue of MIB in the form of bribery arises when businesspeople do not 
perceive any discrepancy between behaviours in line with the laws and codes of conduct and 
behaviours deviant from these laws and codes. Misbehaviours such as bribery conflate therefore 
with aceptable behaviours. MIB can be enhanced in the situation of two factors: a lack of 
relationality at the government level (called institutional dysfunctionality) and a lack of 
relationality at the business/professional level (entitled conflation). The lack of relationality at 
the government level generates lack of relationality at the corporate level, thus increasing 
conflation risks.
Institutional dysfunctionality
Foreign companies mostly come from countries characterized by strong institutions or mature 
networks where different layers of power (e.g. judicial, legislative and executive) are isolated 
from each other, through the system of checks and balances, following Montesquieuian doctrine 
in The Spirit of the Laws, prevailing in Western civilization.  Yet, many African countries have 
weak institutions – from a Western viewpoint -, characterized by emerging networks, which ‘do 
not yet have the critical mass to collapse into a core’ (Fuchs, 2001, p .284). In other words, the 
different layers of power are not necessarily separated, which creates political conflicts of 
interests and confusion for foreigners. In addition, there are no professional organizations to 
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relay codes of conduct tied to institutional legislation. Many of our respondents evoked the 
absence of control and oversight mechanisms. In the words of a member of Parliament (MP) 
from Ghana: 
Corruption in the public sector has been a system where because of a lack of protection of 
government funds, civil servants, public servants and politicians are allowed to basically steal 
the money. We’ll refer to it as thievery, nothing more than that. And this has been made 
possible because of the complete lack of accountability mechanisms. The internal controls, 
the checks and balances that are normally there to protect the funds, are not there. Therefore, 
people are able to steal without fear.
Similarly, a representative of the Ghana Integrity Initiative (GII), a civil society organization 
(CSO), spoke about grand misbehaviour:
There’s a lot of collusion by law makers, law executors, the judiciary and everybody to a 
large extent is involved. Some of the things that leaders, parliamentarians or the Attorney 
General does, create the room for corruption, and this incidence of corruption is impacting 
the economy as a whole.
Collusion conveys lack of barriers and differentiation between the three key components of 
modern governmental institutions, namely lawmakers, i.e. legislative; law executors, i.e. 
executive; and the judiciary, i.e. judicial, therefore creating potentialities for misbehaviour. An 
MP in the current Parliament of Ghana stated:
The governance system encourages Executive Dominance. The average parliamentarian is 
not looking for faults. Onus lies on opposition to do that and often, people tend to look at it as 
political even when it is technical. Until complete separation, it is not going to change.
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The problem then lies in executive dominance where the one in power is unaccountable and 
basically able to do whatever wanted without much opposition from independent entities acting 
as gatekeepers or watchdogs, a predisposer to critical system failures (Coffee, 2006).
Conflation
Foreign mining companies are discerned from the core governmental network, that is, the 
institutions of the country within which they operate. They may perceive discrepancies between 
the functioning of the local government and that of their country of origin, or with their value 
systems. They may perceive a clash between Western-infused macro morality, which emphasizes 
abstract universal systems of formal laws, complementarity of rights and duties, equality and 
justice - required from businesspeople -, and micro morality emphasizing private duties and 
obligations to particular individuals (e.g. family, friends) (De Graaf, 2007).
Consequently, businesspeople– foreign or local - blame the government for issues that derive 
naturally from institutional dysfunction: lack of transparency in the granting of mining 
concessions; personal rapprochement between business and government; gift-giving culture to 
local chiefs; changing legislation; lack of law enforcement and oversight; heavy bureaucracy, 
numerous points-of-contact with governement officials. These dysfunctions increase the demand 
for bribes, and consequently MIB. We shall elaborate more specifically on the issue of the gift-
giving culture to local chiefs, to show how business persons’ perception of relationality may be 
attenuated and trigger corruption. A closed meeting at the residence of Canadian High 
Commissioner with representatives from four Canadian mining companies operating in Ghana, 
brought up rich anecdotes of controversial issues, including corporate relations with tribal chiefs 
and the tension that exists between traditional gift-giving and bribery. One participant said: 
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What would appear to be good practice is that of one company, which has developed detailed 
guidelines of what is acceptable in this – and other – situations. Employees are allowed 
judgement within the guidelines, but need higher level approvals to make gifts outside the 
guidelines. In one instance, it was noted that a request to help restore a tribal chief’s 
residence was turned down, with the explanation that the companies’ CSR projects were 
designed to benefit local communities not individuals. Another company had a different set of 
guidelines, where direct gifts to the tribal chiefs were considered on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. 
The importance that companies establish good relations with local chiefs can only be 
understood in light of the actual power that these local chiefs have. According to the CEO of the 
Ghana Mineral Commission, in the Ghanaian Ministry of Lands and Natural Resources:
During the application process, a lot of things are required including agreement from local 
authorities. If any chief or landowner should raise any form of objection, the process will be 
stalled until everything is resolved. So it is likely companies will court the good will of local 
actors like chiefs. The commission doesn’t get involved in what happens between the project 
proponent [businesspeople] and the landowner [local chief]. They are only interested in 
whether possible objections have been resolved and once the District Chief Executive attests 
to that, the process will go on.
Local chiefs are important political figures with a lot of power in their hands. The lack of 
official involvement from the government and the ambiguous nature of gift-giving would thus 
entice companies to be complacent with chiefs by offering them gifts (i.e. bribes) with the 
promise of facilitating their applications. The practice is amplified by businesspeople’s 
impression that everybody is doing it and their fear of being left behind if they are not engaged in 
this kind of practice. In line with Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory, the prevalence of 
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the practice may lead to the situation where professionals’ opinion might change or even be 
comforted in considering bribery not as reprehensible but as “gift-giving”, and essential for 
conducting business successfully. As a focus group participant in Ghana asserted:
When you are […] not corrupt and you encounter corrupt situations you are likely to resolve 
it immediately but if the whole country is corrupt, law enforcement becomes difficult. […] For 
instance a fresh […] graduate […] in Accra may want to do things in the right manner. […] 
After some time, his attitude changes because everyone around him may be getting rewards 
for doing things in a wrong way that he will be missing out on because of his stern attitude 
against corruption. He/she will even get punished, or transferred to a different department for 
doing the right thing in the long run because it may be preventing others from making money. 
Other respondents from both Ghana and Burkino Faso, independently, concur: 
In the business world, corruption has become the rule. Those who refuse to indulge find 
themselves excluded from business. (MP2 in the 5th, 6th, and 7th parliaments and Treasury 
Inspector, Burkina Faso)
Corruption is commonplace – service providers build the costs of corruption into their prices, 
which makes doing business costly. (VP for Sustainability from a Canadian mining company, 
Burkina Faso)
Presently it is difficult to do business while adhering to moral and ethical value since a 
majority of business people are more interested in profit than moral values. When you decide 
to adhere to these values, then you lose a percentage of your market share and can also lose 
opportunities because of these values. (Head of the CSO Guardians of Democracy, Ghana)
In sum, companies feel destabilized by environments that lack barriers between personal 
relationships and business partnerships: They appear conflated. The large prevalence of various 
Page 21 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cpoib
critical perspectives on international business
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
critical perspectives on international business
practices (e.g. granting gifts) contributes to diminishing the perception of them as anomaly. Both 
the case-by-case approach and the detailed guidelines characterize a process through which the 
ethical gap narrows gradually to become eventually culturally acceptable. Hence, businesspeople 
attempt to recreate relationality (i.e. differences) between what is acceptable and what is not. 
Yet, this process may happen idiosyncratically in reaction to the environmental pressures, by 
means of making a sublation [aufhebung] - in the Hegelian term - of contraditory theses and 
antitheses (Hegel, 1827-1830/2004). Albeit gift-giving would be legally reprehensible in their 
country of origin (e.g. Canada; i.e. thesis), this is not so in the country of operation (i.e. 
antithesis). Lack of relationality implies that the difference between what is normally considered 
as misbehaviour and what is not, are not antinomical anymore. Companies end up internalizing 
the practice but compensate complacency and indulgence by pseudo-relationality in the form of 
ad hoc judgements and guidelines more fitting to the evolving context (i.e. sublation/aufhebung). 
That is, a difference between personal/friendly relationships and formal business relationships so 
that the difference between gift-giving and bribe can be attenuated. This lack of relationality 
leads companies to engage in pseudo-relationality through which they reconsider gift-giving as 
something acceptable for business. 
In sum, MIB in the form of bribery is more likely to arise with increasing institutional 
dysfunctionality and perceptions of conflation between good and bad conducts, while 
dysfunctional institutions also contribute to conflation.
5.2. Substantiality
MIB in the form of bribery supply is also a consequence of inherent substance or 
characteristics of the actors involved in its enactment, which conflates with essentialist 
considerations (Bottega, 2009; Murphy, 2011; Mohr, 2013; Smith, 2010). This leads to the 
Page 22 of 40
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cpoib
critical perspectives on international business
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
critical perspectives on international business
treatment of individual agency (valence) as an important sub-theme of substantiality (i.e. bad 
apple hypothesis). However, considering previous theoretical developments emphasizing the 
impact of macro-environments and culture, MIB may not be explained from an exclusively 
individual perspective. A second sub-theme of culture (valence) illustrates the more complex and 
ambiguous nuances between these two theoretical constructs and the need to consider both 
perspectives to explain MIB.
Agency
Relationality suggests that businesspeople misbehave because of environmental pressures or 
macro configurations that weaken their moral standards through a lack of relationality 
perception. Yet, respondents pointed out that personal values, morals, ethics, will, thus, some 
sort of personal agency, matter too. Hence, the understanding of MIB should not only be based 
on a relational perspective but be complemented by an essentialist perspective which takes the 
intersubjective into account. For example, respondents mentioned that even if there was a strong 
level of relationality within or between many different fields – institutional or professional – 
MIB may still be an issue because of individual characteristics and flaws. In sum, in contrast to a 
deterministic relational perspective, the substantalist notion of agency implies that despite 
environmental pressures, individual subjectivity ultimately determines the occurrence of 
misconduct. Agency may be of positive valence: 
When ethical obligations clash with the realities of doing business, you try to appeal to your 
moral obligations as much as possible. (MP in the current Parliament of Burkina Faso)
If you resist it and are patient, you can have what you want without recoursing to it [MIB]. If 
you are not willing to wait to obtain a given result, you are doomed. If you start bribing, be 
ready to never stop. Do not agree to buy peace. Integrity is a path that requires patience and 
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the willingness to lose from time to time, or see others do better than you. (Respondent to the 
open-ended questionnaire survey)
The former director of […] Awuni who was a no nonsense man, abhorred corruption and 
because of that his promotions were denied for so many years even his juniors by-pass him in 
rank until it got to a time that somebody said enough is enough let’s just give him his 
promotion. There are instances that he had a backlash […] because some politicians were 
caught in corruption issues. He has never been afraid to say it in the media that this is what 
he stands for…. though he died out of it. (focus group participant, Ghana)
Conversely, agency may also be of negative valence in the sense that, even if all the 
arrangements and technology are put in place to reduce corruption, some individuals may still 
continue misbehaving by engaging in bribery:
There are individuals who because they make a living out of it, will use subtle ways to make 
situations complex for normal individuals to induce them to pay bribes. Thus there are also 
human impediments created by individuals in institutions that benefit from corruption to 
support their lifestyle. (focus group participant, Ghana)
Human beings have tendency not to do the right thing when there are no laws, though it does 
not mean that we are all corrupt, when institutions are not functioning well and smart people 
see loopholes and see he can make something of it he will do it. (focus group participant, 
Ghana)
Consequently, respondents indicated that an invididuals’ good morals, ethics or values 
determine at the end whether that individual will engage in MIB. Upholding to strong moral 
values is often very difficult. For instance, an influential Ghanaian journalist said that there are 
currently discussions in Ghana about passing the right to information bill. However, this bill has 
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not passed yet. He stated that he had a professional encounter with a junior officer who is 
demanding an unauthorized fee in order to release a document that can aid him reveal a story 
about the true cost of an item that is currently being debated. This officer is the only person who 
has the document. This situation presents an obvious ethical dilemma that boils down to the core 
moral proclivities of the individual confronted to environmental pressures. If he refuses, he will 
not be able to write about the story of the hidden costs that could have dramatic impacts on the 
political and social arenas. As a journalist though, he owes the public a responsibility to report 
any wrongdoing. Yet, if he accepts, he is himself contributing to the wrongdoing. 
This does not make a compelling case for the bad apple theory though. According to theories 
delegating importance to social pressure in the definition of social identities, the very essence of 
a substantive entity, say an indvidual, results from peer pressure and external social forces, or 
culture. But contrary to Bourdieu’s statement (1998), these forces have subjective and thus 
inherently directional (i.e. good or bad) impact on individuals (Murphy, 2011). 
Culture
Several respondents referred to culture in discussing propensity to misbehave by providing 
bribes or not. Culture may exert either positive of negative valence in that it may encourage or 
reprehend MIB. The increase in a culture of accountability, in Ghana, for example, induces a 
positive cultural valence as it diminishes MIB occurrences in the form of bribery. 
Accountability has come into Ghanaian culture only recently. It is only recently that we have 
begun to question people who seem not to be accountable or transparent… At the time, he 
was Minister of Energy and was signing most of the petroleum agreements no one ever 
questioned him that they wanted to do a review of the agreements. People were not interested 
– not the media nor civil society. Now it seems governance challenges in Ghana have shifted. 
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Seeing democracy in practice has now made people to talk about how do you ensure 
transparency, accountability etc. (MP in the current Parliament of Ghana)
Americans are people like Ghanaians has built these systems for so many years therefore it is 
imbibed in them that you can’t do certain things. (focus group participant, Ghana)
In contrast, culture may exert a negative influence on individuals inasmuch as it may 
constitute a predisposition for them to misbehave. As several respondents suggested:
… incomes are low and with the extended responsibilities from the extended family system 
that public servants have, they try to find extra avenues and ways to make extra money. (focus 
group participant, Ghana)
Some of these wrong doings can also be attributed to our cultural settings, there are some 
sayings in our traditional settings that fuels corruption. For instance there is a saying 
‘everybody eats from his work’; ‘you don’t press the cheek of the one cracking the peanut’. 
These sayings influence us wherever we find ourselves. Young people are also pressured by 
the necessities of lives so that the community will know he/she is also working and getting 
things out of it. (focus group participant, Ghana)
It is almost accepted that when you are in a position to make money, you should make it so 
that your extended family can also benefit. (former MP, Burkina Faso)
In some cultures, micro morality which has to do with connections to people, and informal 
norms, values and obligations based on reciprocity and sociality may be so strong that they 
weaken the sense of macro morality, which is more abstract and based on formal norms and 
equality (Höffling, 2002). Holding such values may reverberate onto behaviour in the form of 
patronage, cronyism, and patrimonial administration in developing countries (Theobald, 1999; 
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Williams and Theobald, 2000) but also in developed countries (e.g. clubs, fraternities, alumni 
networks; Perkin, 1996).
In sum, individual agency valence alone cannot be understood if it is not related to collective 
agency valence that guides individual behaviour. The naturally strong need for acceptance 
exhibited by individuals comes with pressure via cultural persuasiveness, cajoling and influence 
(Murphy, 2011), which ultimately impact individual choices.
5.3. Grounded model
Both relationalistic and substantialistic theoretical frameworks, through their empirically-
grounded proxies of, respectively, relationality, characterized by the level of institutional 
functionality and conflation; as well as of substantiality as defined by agency valence and 
cultural valence, determine a professional’s propensity to misbehave by supplying bribes. As 
shown in Figure 1:
(1) Relationality as a continuum ranges from most dysfunctional institutions (i.e. lack of power 
separation, checks and balances system) and strong conflation (i.e. normalization of questionable 
practices) to most functional institutions (i.e. clear separation of power and efficient checks and 
balances system) and weak conflation (i.e. disregard to questionable practices).
(2) Substantiality as a second continuum ranges from most negatively-valenced agency (i.e. 
absence of morality and ethics) and most negatively-valenced culture (i.e. cultural frames 
conducive to misconduct) to most positively-valenced agency (i.e. strong morality and ethics) 
and most positively-valenced culture (i.e. morality-prone cultural canvass). 
By combining these two axes together four generic configurations emerge: 
(a) Minimally-induced compliance. This is the worst-case scenario characterized by a 
combination of lack of power separation, checks and balances system, strong conflation, at the 
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relational level, and absence of morality and ethics as well as cultural frames conducive to 
misconduct in the form of bribery. In other words, individuals are neither individually 
encouraged to demonstrate good conduct nor are they structurally encouraged to do so. 
(b) Institutionally-induced compliance. Individuals characterized by negatively-valence agency 
and sharing a negatively-valenced culture may nonetheless be driven to good professional 
conduct because of structural dispositions such as highly functional institutions and weak 
conflation issues which prevent them form paying bribes;
(c) Individually-induced compliance constitutes the symmetrical opposite of collectively-induced 
compliance. Individuals who work in settings characterized by most dysfunctional institutions 
and strong conflation are essentially driven by their own selves, that is, by their more positively-
valenced agency and background culture, to show good professional conduct by refusing to pay 
bribes;  
(d) Optimally-induced compliance represents the antinomy of minimally-induced compliance 
and constitutes therefore the best-case scenario. In a nutshell, the maximal level of compliance to 
good professional conduct, as the absence of bribe payment, occurs with highly functional 
institutions and weak conflation, but also positively-valenced agency as well as a positively-
valenced culture. 
--- Insert Figure 2 about here ---
Any given professional setting, characterized by a specific generic configuration in 
compliance to good professional conduct and best practices (d), may crumble down to 
minimally-induced compliance (a) if it regresses from positively-valenced substantiality and 
strong relationality to most negatively-valenced substantiality and weak relationality. 
Conversely, minimally-induced compliance may turn into optimally-induced compliance through 
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actors’ moving up from most-negatively-valenced substantiality and weak relationality to the 
positively-valenced substantiality and strong relationality. We provide a more concrete 
discussion of how to achieve optimally-induced compliance in the section on practical 
implications.  
6. Discussion and conclusion
6.1. Theoretical contribution
This study sought to analyze bribery from the perspective of the MNCs’ professionals who 
are involved in its supply, through the concept of MIB. The opposite of adherence to the 
professional code is what we called MIB. More specifically, we identified how the three 
perspectives on MIB (i.e. functionalist, conflict and ecological) - which have been typically 
studied separately from one another in past literature (Muzio et al., 2016) -, actually interact 
dynamically to create situations conducive to bribery supply. By investingating how both the 
individual and environmental ramifications interact to produce misbehavioural outcomes among 
professionals (i.e. bribery), we demonstrate that it is essential to adopt an integrated instead of a 
siloed perspective to combat the supply of bribery in international business. 
This study uniquely draws on a combination of the classic relationalist sociological 
framework (Bourdieu, 1998), and its recent revision (Murphy, 2011; Bottero, 2009), which we 
name the relationalism-substantialism framework. The findings show that the reason why MIB in 
the form of bribery supply occurs, is not exclusively tied to any given perspective, whether the 
individual (bad apple theory or functionalist perspective), the organization (red barrel or conflict 
perspective) or the wider societal context (bad cellar theory or ecological perspective). Rather, 
these different layers are tightly intertwined and interact with each other for the supply of bribery 
to occur. We propose a net of conceptually-related constructs that intervene in the process of 
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bribery supply occurrence, namely relationality influenced by institutional dysfunctionality and 
conflation; and substantiality through agency and culture.
Through the concept of relationality, derived from the relationalistic framework (Festinger, 
1954; Mische, 2011; Bourdieu, 1998; Emirbayer, 1997), for the supply of bribery to occur, it first 
has to be recognized as such in a system of comparative evaluations where different conducts are 
benchmarked against each other and hierarchically ordered as being more or less hurtful in a 
given profession. The study of the supply of bribes through the MIB lens provides illuminating 
insights in this regard. Formally, professional codes of conduct, which aim at expressing 
explicitly what is MIB, increase members’ relational awareness. For MNCs operating in African 
countries, the level of relational awareness may not be as acute as in the headquarters’ country, 
which leads decision-makers to breach professional codes of conducts, by supplying bribes, 
because of a lack of perceived relationality. These findings have important implications for 
theory in human relations, which typically characterized ethics as a discursive resource (Bardon 
et al., 2017; Clarke and Knights, 2015; Kornberger and Brown, 2007). Similar to ethics, MIB can 
be conceived as a discursive resource on which professionals may draw in their attempts to make 
sense of their environment. Secondly, we recast past results into a more comprehensive 
theoretical whole, namely the relational paradigm, which implies that discourses in past studies 
(e.g. Kornberger and Brown, 2007), should contribute to clearly frame good professional conduct 
in order to make MIB more salient to professionals. Such a process should thus result in a 
diminishing in the supply of bribes.
In contrast to literature on ethics, which focuses on the discursive nature of ethical behaviour, 
we show that, enhanced relationality is not enough to control for MIB, in the form of bribes 
provision, since actual enactment of MIB is also a function of the granular level of the 
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individual, even though that individual is embroided in broader organizational settings or subject 
to wider macro-environmental forces. We thus acknowledge a certain level of personal agency 
exhibited by professionals, and thus, adhere to the theoretical framework of substantialism in 
addition to relationalism to explain MIB in terms of bribery supply. Personal agency is itself a 
product of influences emanating from various layers of the environment (e.g. micro, meso, 
macro), which we conflated in the notion of culture or cultural ingraining. This is the notion of 
Bourdieu’s social capital or habitus concept, which as De Graaf (2007) theoretically suggested, 
is very useful to explain corruption. The concept of habitus, which we elaborated on in the sub-
theme of culture is the recipient of the individual perceptions pertaining to the external world and 
hence, the aspects of culture that are anchored in the mind and resurface in actual behaviour.
While we ackowledge the importance of personal agency, this does not equal rehabilitating 
the bad apple theory. Similarly, the importance of culture or habitus does not mean validating 
either the red barrel or the bad cellar theories in particular as recently proposed (Muzio et al., 
2016). Similarly, we do not emphasize to what extent one perspective may be more salient in one 
context or another. In line with recent works on the need to overcome the relationalism vs. 
substantialism divide, MIB, as bribery supply, may not be explained by relationality and 
substantiality alone. Rather, for the first time, we propose that both are entangled together. Our 
research infuses therefore more formally recent propositions in past sociological studies (Bajde, 
2013; Arnould and Rose, 2016), as well as in the literature on workplace incivility (Pearson et 
al., 2001), in the study of corruption supply in international business. More specifically, both 
(lack of) relationality and (negatively-) positively-valenced substances concur to foster good 
professional conduct (MIB in terms of bribery supply). The effects of lack of relationality or 
negatively-valenced substantiality may be long lasting and alienating to many different entities, 
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and may potentially spill over from instigator to target to witness and even to the public at large. 
MIB in terms of bribery supply should therefore be understood as an organizational problem but 
which has actually ramifications that are rooted well beyond the organization, and should be 
treated to be successfully combated. 
6.2. Practical implications 
We showed that MIB in the form of bribery supply is the result of a decrease in the perception 
of relationality or of the differences among diverse behaviours, ending up being all conflated into 
a flat whole. Therefore, it is essential for organizations to ensure that all of their professional 
members are aware of the behaviours that are clearly considered as deviant. Professional codes 
and guidelines should be as detailed as possible leaving no stone unturned, and no grey zone or 
loophole apparent. One important way, to further compliance with codes or guidelines, is 
institutional functioning in its broadest sense. This means that the institutions (e.g. associations) 
in charge of devising the codes and enforcing them should themselves be characterized by 
relationality such as for example by separating layers of power and installing system of checks 
and balances, which would prevent the cover-up of controversial cases. 
The division of powers, mirroring that in central government, should be applicable to 
professional associations as well, so that they may function effectively. Doing so sends also a 
positive signal to professionals and society alike about the sincerety of the association, the 
reputation of the profession and of its practicians. 
As observed in the data, a relationalist perspective is not sufficient to fight against what 
Muzio et al. (2016) call “rogue individuals” who turn into “bad apples” and end up 
contaminating the rest of the orchard. Instead, personal agency, will, norms, values, which are 
strongly influenced by the individual social capital, habitus, or ingrained culture, often 
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determines in the end an individual’s eventual proclivity to engage in misbehaviour. Individuals 
will react differently given their cultural background, morals and values. Practically, this means 
that in addition to work on the structural aspect of the code, associations and decision-makers 
should work on education and transmitting the set of universalistic values promoting ethics and 
morality. One respondent, the Vice-President for Sustainability from a mining company in 
Ghana, mentioned offering Christmas hampers such as corporate t-shirts with anti-misbehaviour 
messages, as well as gadgets or books such as The Bad Samaritans. 
Importantly misbehaviour may spread once it is performed and thus contaminate not only 
professional spheres but political or civilian ones as well. In the study, some specific initiatives 
that were proposed to break the cycle of MIB in terms of bribe supply were anonymous 
corporate whistblower systems or the use of the Ipaidabribe.com website. Business 
representatives from mining companies proposed the introduction of e-governance whereby 
human and government contact is limited to break the vicious circle of MIB in terms of bribe 
supply especially between business professionals and governments. Overall, the promotion of 
ethics should not be limited to a professional association alone, but should extend to the whole 
public. Exhorting civil society to behave ethically will reduce the incidence of MIB as bribery 
whether emanating from within or outside the professional milieu.
7. Limitations 
The study drew upon a considerable amount of data from diverse sources. While this is an 
important advantage, because it provides the authors with a multi-dimensional perspective on a 
sensitive issue, it must be noted that it does not enable us to go as deeply into the data as 
suggested in the conventional qualitative methods literature (Patton, 2002). We follow De 
Graaf’s (2007) guidelines in the application of Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, but may 
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therefore lack in-depth study of contingencies as recommended by the author. However, multi-
faceted opinions on the subject under study enabled us to better dissect the issue on hand than if 
we had focused on one single actor or entity alone (i.e. government, professional, CSO, local 
chief), which would have showed social desirability. The access to a greater variety of 
viewpoints enabled us to take a more integrated stance and be more nuanced in our 
interpretations of the data. Although this study focuses on MIB, we investigated and analyzed it 
in the broader context of corruption. Corruption closely relates to MIB because corruption 
conflates with MIB, in tha  it is behaviour where the expected standard has not been manifested 
(Neale, 1996). Corruption may thus be conceived as an extreme manifestation of MIB in the 
exercise of a profession. Therefore, we believe that the conceptual closeness of both terms does 
not preclude us from the use of a case focused on corruption to theorize about MIB. 
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Figure 1. Progressive data structure
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Figure 2. Generic configurations of misconduct in business
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